Debriefing

Session 1

Luis F. Gómez L.
luis.gomezl@unimilitar.edu.co

Distance Learning Faculty

9 September, 2025

Please Read Me

  • Purpose

    • Discuss negotiation performance, share feedback, and identify key learning points during the debrief

Resource imbalances and the relationship among the parties

  • There is a disparity between the resources controlled by each role

    • A control more resources than B
    • B control more resources than C

    \[A > B > C\]

  • For this reason, roles must be randomly assigned to ensure fairness

Types of agreements

Table 1: Agreements excluding C
A B C
59 59 0
60 58 0
60 60 1
59 59 3

Table 2: Agreements which tend to have an equally distribution of points
A B C
121/3 121/3 121/3
41 40 40
43 40 38

Table 3: Agreements according to the control of resources
A B C
60 40 21
50 40 31

  • Other agreements

    • A became so greedy so B and C exclude A
    • C blocks the coalition between A and B and chooses to work with A1

Stability of coalitions

  • A: 59, B: 59

    • C is excluded

  • Counter offer by C: A: 60, C: 24

    • B is excluded

  • Counter offer by B: A: 61, B: 57

    • C is excluded

  • Counter offer by C: A: 62, A: 22

    • B is excluded

It is possible to prove that in this game any coalition can be brake

Fairness criteria

  • Possible states in case of agreement
Figure 1: Scenarios in the game if an agreement is reached

Figure 2: Jeremy Bentham

  • Benthamite social welfare function

    • \(G_i\): grade of student \(i\)

\[\max \frac{1}{n}G_1 + \cdots \frac{1}{n}G_n = \max \sum_{i = 1}^n \frac{1}{n}G_i\]

Figure 3: John Rawls

  • Rawlsian social welfare function

    • \(G_i\): grade of student \(i\)

\[\max \min \{ G_1, \ldots, G_m \}\]

Acknowledgments

References

Program on Negotiation. (2008). Three Party Coalition Exercise - Game Theory and Negotiation Analytics Role-Play (Harvard Law School, Ed.).

Footnotes

  1. Less common agreement